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ABSTRACT
Introduction
At a time when protracted conflict has become the norm, during which we will repeatedly deploy and employ major portions of our Army,… units will need to achieve and sustain a level of readiness,… The effects we seek are board: continuity in training, stability of leadership, unit cohesion, enhanced unit effectiveness, and greater deployment predictability for Soldiers and their Families. taking care a families, and leadership. This paper will focus the remaining portions on those areas mentioned and the impact they have on meeting the CSA initiative of restoring balance to the force using the ARFORGEN process.
We will explore their importance and impact in the upcoming chapters. This paper uses actual events to illustrate the challenges with implementing the current parameters of the ARFORGEN as it relates to the task organization of EAB combat service support (CSS) units. The bottom line is that EAB CSS units are not organized like maneuver BCTs and therefore do not fit neatly into the ARFORGEN process. Therefore, the time is now to reorganize the EAB CSS units into battalion and brigade formations in order for the ARFORGEN to work effectively and to restore the balance to the entire force.
Army Force Generation Process-What It's Supposed to Be
While "what" the Army does for the Nation is enduring, "how" we do it must adapt to meet the changing world security environment. We are in an era of persistent conflict which, when combined with our on-going global engagements, requires us to rebalance our capabilities. We do this remembering that Soldiers and the Families, who support them, are the strength and centerpiece of the Army.
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As it became increasingly evident that the Army would need to deploy large numbers of soldiers over a protracted period of time to Afghanistan and, especially, Iraq, the Service found itself transforming in the wake of events, rather than in anticipation of them. The Army has responded by restructuring from a division-to a brigade-based force, the so-called modular force, and by establishing a brigade rotational base through use of Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN). The strategic concept for the Army is to adapt and implement ARFORGEN to meet requirements for continuous full-spectrum operations and to preserve the all volunteer force in persistent conflict. The Army must generate large scale rotational forces to create conditions for enduring victory in the long war against terror.
Simultaneously, Army forces must defend the homeland, provide Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA), deter conflict in critical regions, remain ready to respond promptly to small-scale contingencies and swiftly defeat the enemy in major combat operations. To meet these multiple strategic challenges, the Army will shift from tiered readiness to cyclic readiness to address both rotational and contingency requirements. In summary, ARFORGEN is a cyclic training and readiness process. To be successful, strategic planning, prioritization and resourcing must all be synchronized to produce fully trained forces on a schedule that meets mission requirements. ARFORGEN is intended to result in trained and cohesive units, to streamline training and deployment management, and to provide greater stability for Soldiers and their Families.
The benefits of ARFORGEN are widely accepted; however, the proper implementation raises many challenges. At first review, these challenges tend toward logistics concerns, and military subject matter experts describe them in terms of resource availability and planning. As an example, it is critical that training schedules be synchronized to seamlessly supply Soldiers of the needed specialties and experience levels into the Reset/Train pool. Upon closer scrutiny, it is clear that innovations in training and personnel management could perhaps relieve some of the pressure on the planning and logistics pipeline. Such innovations are likely to come with a cost, perhaps to unit cohesion, perhaps in skill retention rates, or some other measure. It is important to fully understand that cost to make good decisions about the benefits of the innovation.
Unity of Command
You know I am sure that not numbers or strength bring victory in war; but whichever army goes into battle stronger in soul, their enemies generally cannot with stand them. 6 Practice of unity of command requires the placement of all forces operating in a specific theatre to achieve a distinct objective under a single commander. This originated in the Civil War, and reached an apogee with the ascension of General U. S. Grant as General-in-Chief of the US Army; an investiture of supreme command designed to unify all northern military efforts under one brain. 7 By 1914, the idea had become a combat principle, articulated in Field Service
Regulations as such: "Unity of command is essential to success. . . . All troops assigned to the execution of a distinct tactical task must be placed under one command." 8 It took the desperate situation created by the German offensive of March 1918 before allied generals could accept this essential principle. 9 Unity of command is one of the nine principles of war adopted by the US Army.
That for every objective ensures unity of effort under one responsible commander. It is foolish to believe that a Soldier's loyalty, trust and commitment belong to his leaders and organization alone. Leaders must be sensitive to the needs of the family.
Figures from past reports show about half of the young Soldiers are married and over 82% of both the Noncommissioned Officer Corps and Officer Corps are married.
Families, who often feel isolated and lack a sense of belonging, need both a formal (Family Readiness Groups) and informal support structure, especially when the unit is deployed. Likewise Soldiers need to know their families are being taken care of during deployments.
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Changing command structures as often as the units in 13 th ESC have experienced can cause cracks or complete failures in the unity of command. Units will see a raise in unlawful actions such as alcohol related incidents, assaults, divorces etc. To understand the severity of the changes in command structures have on unity of command we will examine the command structure of the 13 th ESC in June/July 2005 timeframe. In addition, the Sustainment brigades and battalion headquarters deployed into theater without any of the subordinates units they commanded and controlled in garrison for their train up prior to deployment. They fell in on a "pick-up" team of like subordinate units, but had no prior relationship. Therefore, these brigades and battalions headquarters had to take the time to built unity of command relationships… this is not an ideal task when one is already involved in combat operations. The unit experienced a raise in several Army Well-Being areas; divorces, assaults, alcohol related issues along with a shortage of personnel when Soldiers were declared non-deployable based on health issues or other related DA policies. The ad hoc command structure had to revert to unique solutions in orders to ensure the unit could meet deployment criteria set by higher headquarters that were often oblivious to the exceptional challenges this unit faced.
In one particular case, the unit needed additional 20 88M (motor transport divers) personnel to meet its mandated deployment strength. 15 The The policies directed by higher headquarters and Department of the Army were not written with units below the brigade level in mind, but more for the BCTs who deployed and went through the ARFOGEN process as a whole. Policies were not executed equally across the force and created the have and have nots. When the Commanding General of the 13 th ESC asked for an exception to the policy to delete the 96 th Trans from its fourth straight deployment it was denied by the higher headquarters that created the deficiency. Therefore the ad hoc command and control structures in charge of all these companies within the 13 th ESC had to develop policies that cover particular areas that were not addressed adequately for their unique situation.
The 13 th ESC is once again creating, yet another, ad hoc organization to compensate for the deploying battalion and brigade headquarters while the other battalion and brigade headquarters are set to redeploy. Figure 3 depicts the current command structure. Note that some battalions and one brigade headquarters are no longer available due to inactivation. In addition, the 13 th SCE gained additional battalions and two brigades, but none of the company level units are organic to these higher headquarters.
The companies have changed battalion and brigade headquarters five times thus far. 
Training and Leader Development
Developing cohesion and the will to fight in individuals and units is a dynamic process. Training and leadership are the two most essential components contributing to unit characteristics. 17 They enhance and strengthen the bonds of trust and mutual respect between Soldiers and Soldiers and their leaders. 18 When unit characteristics are out of balance so are training and leader development programs.
With the many changes in command structure within 13 th ESC, units have experience a decline in training and leader development from moderate to severe in most of its company size units. In addition, companies have gone years without their primary mission essential equipment in order to conduct their wartime mission. In some cases, battalion commanders and their staffs have lost their focus on training and leader development largely due to the requirements placed on them by higher headquarters and outside influences. Because of the many changes in command structure leader development programs, at all levels, were lacking sufficient utility to meet the needs of leader growth. 13 th ESC units, as a whole, were experiencing an imbalance in Army culture.
When Army culture is out of balance there is friction between Army beliefs and practices. Over time, that friction threatens readiness. This friction can be characterize as too many short-term, back-to-back deployments and exercises, trying to do too much with available resources, too many non-mission and late taskings, too many directed training events, and senior leader "can do" attitudes that put too much on the plate. 19 It creates an undisciplined operational pace that affects every facet of Army life.
Training is not done to standard; leader development in operational assignments is limited and does not meet expectations; Soldiers of all ranks and their families elect to leave the service early. The Army is undertaking a paradigm shift in unit training and leader development, and readiness as it implements ARFORGEN. Unit training and leader development, and the readiness reporting related to that, will move from the band of excellence to one of progressive and increasing capability over time. 23 As the Army moves to this new standard, it must align and integrate EAB CSS units, at a minimum at the battalion level, to fully capitalize on unity of command when it comes to training and leader development and the other issues listed in Figure 1 .
The unity of command principle recognizes the strong relationship between Army culture and the quality of training and leader development programs. Army culture must operate routinely within an acceptable band of tolerance for the Army to effectively train soldiers and grow leaders. Any change that widens the gap between beliefs and practices in the Army culture impacts the Army's ability to train soldiers and grow leaders.
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Aligning EAB CSS units in battalions and brigades will allow the Army culture to flourish within the Army's most precious resource, its Soldiers.
Conclusion and Recommendation
The The ARFORGEN process is leading the charge in transformation and replacing antiquated systems as we fight wars on two fronts simultaneously, OIF and OEF, and provide forces for homeland contingency crisis. EAB CSS units are out of balance, not because they are broken-Soldiers and Leaders remain resolved and committed-but due to a marked increase in the breadth, scope and magnitude of current operations and engagements expected of these units over the last five years.
CSA General Casey recently stated referring to the ARFORGEN process "… we are moving forward, and I think we are well on a path to bringing ourselves back into a state of balance. … but for the first time, I'm starting to see daylight, and I see how the plans that we have put in place can move us over the next three years to a position of balance, so that we can continue to prepare for the uncertain future." 26 However, for EAB CSS units it is hard for them to even get started out of the ARFOREGEN process.
The time is now to begin organizing the EAB CSS units into cohesive units maximizing the principle of warm unity of command. By doing so, the Army will gain greatly in the near, mid, and long terms. In the short term, senior leaders will gain an enterprise view of EAB CSS units in readiness and deployment sequence just like they do for BCTs. The CSA must issue guidance to achieve battalion level cohesion at the battalion level for resourcing.
Furthermore, fix Sustainment brigade fragmentation and adjust the timing of deployments to allow units to conduct a Mission Readiness Exercise (MRE) and deploy as a cohesive task organization (one deployment date for all units). By doing so, you deploy well-led, trained, and equipped EAB CSS units. In the long term, we need to change two more challenges and they are create Standard Requirement Codes (SRCs) for CSSB and formalize C² relationships and eliminate ad-hoc organizations in our sustainment doctrine for EAB sustainment units (i.e., assign CSS battalions to Sustainment brigades).
The biggest hurdle for those units to overcome is the way they are tasked organized. The time is now to reorganize the EAB CSS units into habitual battalions and align them with Sustainment Brigades thus taking advantage of the ARFORGEN process and instilling the Army culture to last over the long haul. The next step would be to align the Sustainment brigades with their battalions for training and readiness oversight to expeditionary Sustainment commands, but that is a topic for another paper.
